Digital forensics investigative framework for control rooms in critical infrastructure by Cusack, Brian & Mahmoud, Amr
Edith Cowan University 
Research Online 
Australian Digital Forensics Conference Conferences, Symposia and Campus Events 
2018 
Digital forensics investigative framework for control rooms in 
critical infrastructure 
Brian Cusack 
Amr Mahmoud 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.ecu.edu.au/adf 
 Part of the Information Security Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Cusack, B., & Mahmoud, A. (2018). Digital forensics investigative framework for control rooms in critical 
infrastructure. DOI: https://doi.org/10.25958/5c52674f66685 
DOI: 10.25958/5c52674f66685 
Cusack, B., & Mahmoud, A. (2018). Digital forensics investigative framework for control rooms in critical 
infrastructure. In proceedings of Proceedings of the 16th Australian Digital Forensics Conference(pp. 17-23). Perth, 
Australia: Edith Cowan University. 
This Conference Proceeding is posted at Research Online. 
https://ro.ecu.edu.au/adf/177 
DIGITAL FORENSICS INVESTIGATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR 
CONTROL ROOMS IN CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
Brian Cusack, Amr Mahmoud 
Cyber Forensic Research Center, Auckland University of Technology, New Zealand 
brian.cusack@aut.ac; amr.mahmoud@aut.ac.nz 
 
Abstract 
In this paper a cyber-forensic framework with a detailed guideline for protecting control systems is developed to 
improve the forensic capability for big data in critical infrastructures. The main objective of creating a cyber-
forensic plan is to cover the essentials of monitoring, troubleshooting, data reconstruction, recovery, and the safety 
of classified information. The problem to be addressed in control rooms is the diversity and quantity of data, and 
for investigators, bringing together the different skill groups for managing data and device diversity. This research 
embraces establishing of a new digital forensic model for critical infrastructures that supports digital forensic 
investigators with the necessary information for conducting an advanced forensic investigation in Critical 
Infrastructures. The framework for investigation is presented here and elaborated. The extended work applies the 
framework to industry case studies and is not reported here. 
Keywords 
Digital Forensics, Control Room, Critical Infrastructure, Investigation 
INTRODUCTION 
The contribution of this paper comes from a substantial literature review and analysis of forensic methodologies 
that may be appropriate for control rooms in critical infrastructures. Figure 1 provides the context of study and the 
resultant framework is presented in Figure 2. Existing digital forensic models are designed and developed with 
specific characteristics for target areas. The target areas have traditionally been adequately covered by the models 
and investigator best practice guidelines (Reimer, 2013). For example, digital forensic models have been designed 
to perform network forensics, computer forensics, cloud network, and mobile forensics. These traditional 
techniques are no longer suitable to deal with the age of data. Large volumes of data “Big Data” is a new age that 
has the problem of dealing with large data sets that are analysed computationally in order to expose patterns. Non-
traditional ways and design are required to deal with these large volumes of data and still maintain the integrity of 
investigations. A growth area for forensic investigation is in conducting forensic investigations in industrial control 
systems (Cherdantseva, 2016; Rodrigo and Morocho, 2017). These are a complex process not only because of the 
diversity of data, but also the variety of physical and logical partitions that are interconnected to the network 
including name nodes, data nodes and checkpoints. This type of investigation requires collecting all sources of 
information not only from a suspect computer, but also from the system itself. Most sensitive events and logs are 
recorded into the node controllers (Stouffer, Falco, and Scarfone, 2015). Therefore, this issue can be solved by 
applying Hadoop cluster to acquire the information from the HDFS file system metadata. Conducting a clustering 
reconnaissance phase will provides valuable information about data blocking, size, and replication factors based 
on a Block ID. 
General investigation guidelines for control centres are fragmented across many documents and an assumption 
that what works in some areas of investigation will work everywhere (Casey, 2011; Reimer, 2013). The deliverable 
from this research has been a resolution of the current partitions of information in the literature into a working 
framework for large and diverse data sets in control rooms for critical infrastructures. The framework is called a 
Corrective Big Data Forensic Investigation Model for Critical Infrastructure. It was designed to control 
components interconnected to the network infrastructure such as data clusters, load balancers, servers, and 
engineering workstations. The proposed model was set to be implemented according to design science research 
methodology. This research methodology proved its capability of uncovering all vulnerabilities while lab testing 
was conducted. Throughout the testing, it was found that supplementary steps can be added to increase more 
acquisition of digital evidence and improve the quality of the credible sources of data. The model has been verified 
by pilot testing on case study scenarios and test data. The following sections of this paper elaborate the background 
and model components.  
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BACKGROUND CONTEXT 
 
Figure 1 encapsulates the networks of a critical infrastructure organisation and layers each functionality 
against the requirements. This summary provides the general context of study.  
 
Figure 1. Critical infrastructure context 
DIGITAL FORENSIC CHALLENGES 
 
An effective forensic method in critical infrastructures must screen and record actions and user’s events from the 
complex environment in order to enable overall access to the data (Carlini, 2016; Adrien, 2016). A microscopic 
view would support credible information about the user incoming and outgoing network packets within the 
network; for example, a time to live (TTL) connection, the volume of data packets transmitted, the size of each 
data packet, and identify the type of transmitted information related with each link. A macroscopic perspective, 
on the other hand, would support information of how many connections were successfully established, the average 
TTL of each request and the overall volume of data transmitted. Therefore, challenges in a number of critical 
phases have been identified as a part of the problem solving. The challenging areas are defined in collection, data 
analysis and reporting phases (Cornelius and Mark, 2008; Dhanunjoya, 2018). 
Automation is critical for the collection of evidence. The challenges in the context are: Control system key 
information resources; data retention; volatility (this inviable because the data within the collection process is 
removed, deleted, or overwritten, and this can make it impossible to be detected in its original state (Horokuan, 
2015); “Data Mingling” (Folkerth, 2015) (the data mixture and being indistinguishable); and data classification 
(Reimer, 2013). In the data analysis phase tool availability for the volume of data and the diversity of data require 
automation (Ghani, 2013). Sophisticated tools such as those that copy processes, examine evidence, and analyse 
programs for generating checksums in order to complete the verification, may not fit perfectly to some of the 
control systems technologies. Consequently, many digital forensic tools in different areas such as network 
forensics, database forensics, computer forensics, and mobile forensics will require testing before use for relevance 
to the environment (Grispos, Glisson, & Storer, 2015). Therefore, digital forensics vendors will have to apply new 
modifications to their software and frameworks in order to fill the gap and meet the challenge (Beebe, 2009; Watt 
and Slay, 2015).  
The reporting phase must consider data volume, diversity and the usefulness of the report. The documentation 
must be presented in a usable format. This is usually in digital formats and it is reusable for system improvement 
and investigatory purposes. Documentation relevance and usefulness ensures the success of any forensic 
investigation in control systems environments but this requires preparation and design (Agarwal, & Kothari, 2015, 
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p.567). Asset owners have to take preparation steps in order to identify and detect any types of changes that could 
be done during operating system installation, configurations of devices, hardware, or any elements whose modified 
behaviour may affect the original equipment manufacturer specification (Weiss, 2010). Documentation allows 
reporting to have a factual basis but the challenges of timeliness, relevance and volumes still have to be addressed. 
PROPOSED SOLUTION 
 
Conducting forensic investigations in industrial control systems have become a complex process not only because 
of the diversity of data, but also the variety of physical and logical partitions that are interconnected to the network 
including name nodes, data nodes and checkpoints (Ahmad, Hadgkiss and Suighaur, 2012). This type of 
investigation requires collecting all sources of information not only from the suspect computer, but also from the 
system itself. Most of sensitive events and logs are recorded into the nodes controllers (Quick and Choo, 2017). 
Therefore, this issue can be solved by leading a reconnaissance on Hadoop cluster to acquire the information of 
HDFS file system metadata. Conducting a clustering reconnaissance phase will provide valuable information about 
data blocking, size, and replication factors based on Block ID (Amadeo and Abdo, 2018). The Corrective Big Data 
Forensic Investigation Model for Critical Infrastructure (Figure 2) was designed to control components 
interconnected to the network infrastructure such as data clusters, load balancers, servers, and engineering 
workstation. It shows the link between big data clusters in big data rooms and engineering workstations in control 
rooms. One of the benefits gained from applying the Model was that forensic investigation could be made relevant 
across the variants of the complex system. The improved model shows the additional stages for conducting remote 
forensic investigation before performing the actual forensic investigation. These stages can assist in collecting and 
documenting digital evidence. The following sub-sections review the application to each scenario. 
Engineering Workstation Forensic Investigation 
A digital forensic investigation in engineering workstations or control rooms is a term that can be used in critical 
infrastructures to include all electronic devices that are interconnected with each other for sending/receiving 
messages or two-way communications, such as, mobile phones, laptops, computers, tablets, PDAs, programmable 
logic controllers, human machines interfaces, and supervisory control and data acquisition systems (Adelstein, 
2006; Fehr, 2015). These systems and devices have their own storage systems. Either physical storage systems or 
virtual technologies such as cloud computing for logging all activities, incidents, and events (Martini and Choo, 
2014). Conducting a forensic investigation on engineering workstations and applying physical and remote data 
acquisition will discover evidence that can be used for legal, employment, and other purposes (Jones and Leitha, 
2016). In this type of investigation, physical and remote data acquisition are an advantage. The following 
paragraphs summarise each of the stages and the relevant relationships depicted in Figure 2. 
Planning & Identification: at this stage, the incident has to be verified in order to collect fact sheets and plan for a 
handling strategy on the particular case. The major objective of this phase is to boost the productivity of gathering 
the necessary information about the incident and facilitate the process of data acquisition. Furthermore, obtaining 
authorisations and authentications are also compulsory, when the case needs an authorised access to the system 
for logging in to the log system at the initial stage. System settings are one of most important facts required to be 
obtained by official and authorised investigators for determining the device’s system state when the incident 
occurred. System settings can include the system specifications of all machines that are under investigation, and 
the time or date. Moreover, conducting a network reconnaissance is the last step to obtain IP addresses of all 
machines and their mac addresses and any other information that could lead to personal ownership identification 
or related activities. 
Search & Data Collection: at this stage, all information will be collected from the suspect machines as they have 
been put into the investigation process. This step will require more detailed information about the daily events for 
the user on the machine or device. All information that will be collected, will be taken into consideration and will 
be preserved for the next step. The collected data will go in to a complex process to determine whether the data 
acquired is considered as admissible or not admissible. If the data is admissible, it will go to further investigation 
for finding the relevant evidence for the case. If not, the data will be stored for a specific period of time and 
reserved for analyse later when the circumstances have changed. This stage aims to prepare all potential credible 
data to go through a parsing process, which is a more detailed analysis of the data. All necessary data will be 
available for an advanced level data acquisition from the control room. 
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Initial Assessment: at this stage, penetration testing will be conducted remotely for acquiring live data on the 
suspect machines when the users have not been formally informed that their machines are going through forensic 
investigation. This step will assist in preserving live data before the digital evidence gets damaged or corrupted. 
The aim of this step is to combat the anti-forensic tools used by advanced persistent threat (APT) attackers and 
professional hackers in critical infrastructures. Dead acquisition will be confirmed as the second step when 
evidence is found on the suspect machines. At this step, screenshots can be taken as a credible evidence of 
unauthorised access to the resources in the engineering workstation. 
Data Examination: at this stage, the timeline will be analysed methodically. All data, fact sheets, system settings, 
parsed data, and data that came from the initial assessment will go to further processes of data analysis and 
examination. Timeline analysis will analyse the data from different perspectives. This is a vital stage and beneficial 
as it comprises evidence history such as what time the files have been accessed, modified, created and changed in 
a clear format that humans can understand. The data is collected using a diversity of applications and is released 
from the layer of metadata from the file system (recorded from Linux or Windows platforms) and then analysed. 
The timeline is fixed and application data reconstructed if required as a part of data analysis and examination. 
Furthermore, media and artefact analyses is addressed, for example, what applications have been executed, which 
archives have been opened downloaded, which documents have been clicked on, which records were checked, 
which files were deleted, where did the user browse to and many other properties. Another type of analysis, which 
is necessary for finding indirect paths of information is at the signature level. This analysis, when forensic 
investigators implement techniques and practices that will search for byte signatures of known folders, files and 
regular expressions that lead to the cookies. Furthermore, link analysis is employed to find the relationships and 
trusted links to other entities, servers, domains, email, people, and other relevant objects that can be traced to 
identify all possible communications.  
Reporting & Presentation: The last stage contains reporting the results of the analysis and then presenting it to 
requested recipients. This step includes stating potential risks, clarifying the actions taken, specifying what other 
arrangements that are required. Also suggesting enhancements to procedures, guidelines, policies, applications, 
and other aspects of the forensic process investigations required in the target infrastructure. This step is essential 
as it is important for the stakeholders in order to determine what strategies they must think about for future 
preparation. The report has to be formulated in a form that is acceptable to the court or for any legal, employment 
or administrative purpose. 
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Fig. 2. Corrective Big Data Forensic Investigation Model for Critical Infrastructures 
 
 
Hadoop HDFS Forensic Investigation 
A digital forensic investigation in big data rooms using big data platforms, such as Hadoop HDFS, is not a common 
occurrence. A big data platform is used in critical infrastructures to include all logical nodes that are interconnected 
with each other for sending/receiving messages or two-way communications, such as, primary nodes, secondary 
nodes or checking-out nodes, and data nodes. These nodes have their own storage systems and distributed file 
systems technology such as Hadoop HDFS for logging all activities, incidents, and events. Conducting a forensic 
investigation on Hadoop HDFS and applying live and dead data acquisition will give evidence that can be used 
for all legal, employment, and other purposes. In this type of investigation, live and dead data acquisition are an 
advantage. The following paragraphs give a detailed description of each stage of investigation. 
Planning & Identification: at this stage, basic properties of Hadoop HDFS has to be identified by a qualified 
forensic investigator in order to plan for the best strategy to initiate the forensic investigation procedure. 
Identifying those properties requires obtaining necessary authorisations for gaining access to the highest 
credentials on the system, identifying the name node address and its jurisdictions. The purpose of establishing 
these credentials is to acquire metadata system specifications and files, which provides the forensic investigator 
with the information for the process to progress. Examples of this information can include: block ID, block size, 
and replication factors with all nodes installed on the system. RAM memory acquisition should come first, as any 
delay of this process can risk losing potential forensic evidence. Inbuilt commands of the Hadoop system are 
required to be implemented as an initial step of acquiring cluster administration. This step can be done in a number 
of ways, for example, “Hadoop fsck”, and “dfsadmin -report”, as well as offline image viewer. It is highly 
recommended to access the system remotely from a virtual forensic workstation and execute these commands for 
reducing the risk of evidence validity, and minimise the interaction with the name node cluster.  The Planning and 
identification operation will assist in the next phase, which is the search and data collection phase to collect only 
admissible evidence.  
Search & Data Collection: at this stage, the data sources have been identified for further investigation. The 
Checkpointing operation is established for performing the task of including admissible evidence and excluding 
inadmissible evidence. This operation is meant to be prior to File System Image acquisition and analysis. To 
lighten the risk on the live cluster of data corruption in this stage, and to go in parallel with the concept of reducing 
cluster interaction during the forensic process, the checkpointing operation is carried outside the system in a virtual 
environment. The Hadoop is configured in pseudo distributed mode set specifically for forensic workstation 
investigations. In the stage of search and data collection, all copies of file system images and edits logs are 
collected, placed in the forensic workstation by the inbuilt command “checkpoint -force”. This command will 
update the name node with the latest operations done on the system to give descriptive information about each 
transaction and event. This operation will assist in validating the credibility of the digital artefact in the next stage, 
which is the initial assessment. 
Initial Assessment & Data Examination: these stages are working in parallel with the Hadoop HDFS architecture, 
as live and dead acquisition are linked with each other and required to be confirmed for analysing the data collected 
from the previous stages. The data that has been received from the different data sources such as RAM and clusters 
of name nodes, secondary nodes, and data nodes. It will go through analysis and assessment processes. Live 
artefact acquisition on the name node is performed to target the HDFS directory and system administration and to 
allocate the data storage of all partitions and nodes installed on the Hadoop. Data blocks will be matched with all 
block IDs in order to get the final outcome of the live analysis of assigning each operation to each user. These 
requirements are substantial because they relate to the internal block ID, which is specified to the HDFS data 
block. It is itemized, and the physical start offset address that the block is located within has the storage of data 
node. Moreover, the differential live analysis report versions of the file system image files, in terms of pre-
checkpointing and post-checkpointing operations can support forensic investigators with beneficial information 
that clarifies the importance to identify any obvious inconsistencies. Dead acquisition of artefacts on the data nodes 
is performed as a vital part of forensic investigations to specify the suspect nodes in the workstation, so it can be 
investigated thoroughly. It is anticipated that the forensic investigator is now residing physically on the system 
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and doing dead acquisition on the basis of affected block IDs with suspected nodes. This process allows forensic 
investigators to select and target only required data nodes for initial imaging and assessing processes. Data 
reconstruction is one of critical processes in Hadoop HDFS, due to the complexity of its data structuring. This part 
involves data carving for reconstructing the deleted block IDs found on the HDFS. Reconstructing the deleted 
block IDs will enable examiners to validate the type of action made to delete the particular block ID. 
Reporting & Presentation: The last stage contains reporting the results of the analysis and then present it to 
requesting recipients and stakeholders. All results found are documented in this phase to state the plan of action 
for all potential risks as well as recommendations for a safeguard plan for protecting the privacy of the information 
included in the report. Then the report will be presented in a formal format. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has reported a digital forensic investigation framework for control rooms in critical 
infrastructure contexts. This is a big step forward towards addressing the data diversity and volume 
problems that have defeated previous attempts to design a comprehensive solution. Previous attempts to 
generalise such frameworks have stopped at particular installations, equipment or tool selections. The 
literature reviewed was comprehensive and the Corrective Big Data Forensic Investigation Model for 
Critical Infrastructures is an advancement on previous attempts. The further research is to apply it to an 
industry context and to implement further design science quality improvement design cycles.  
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